Treyes vs Larlar (G.R. No. 232579 September 8, 2020)

Dr. Nixon L. Treyes vs Antonio L. Larlar etal
G.R. No. 232579 September 8, 2020

J. Caguioa

Facts: On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who did not bear any children with petitioner Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left behind seven siblings, i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne. At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties, situated in various locations in the Philippines, which she owned together with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties (subject properties).

Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self- Adjudication dated September 2, 2008 and May 19, 2011. The first Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered by petitioner Treyes with the Register of Deeds (RD) of Marikina City on March 24, 2011, while the second Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered with the RD of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on June 5, 2011. In these two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, petitioner Treyes transferred the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie. The private respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint dated July 12, 2013 (Complaint) for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and possession, partition, and damages against petitioner Treyes, the RD of Marikina, the RD of the Province of Rizal, and the RD of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental

Issue: Whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession.

HELD: In the Case of Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, et al. and Preceding Cases, [xxx] the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.

Nevertheless, the Court likewise added in Ypon that there are circumstances wherein a determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not a precondition for the institution of an ordinary civil action for the sake of practicality, i.e., (1) when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and (2) when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally terminated and cannot be re-opened:

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., the Court held that:

"[F]rom the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, x x x [t]he right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings."

The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs and intestate heirs. They refer to relatives that become heirs by virtue of compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the case may be, by operation of law.

In the instant case, Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the widow or widower, shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the other half:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. (953-837a).

Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial determination, the private respondents siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that right. What they seek is the enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in relation to Article 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.

To stress once more, the successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or expectant — they vest upon the death of the decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action to protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real parties in interest in the instant case. To delay the enforcement of such rights until heirship is determined with finality in a separate special proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil Code which recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a moment’s interruption — upon the death of the decedent.

Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only between and among the parties.

Ivler vs Modesto-San Pedro (G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010)

Jason Ivler vs Honorable Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716 November 10, 2010

J. Carpio

Facts: Sometime in August of 2004, petitioner Ivler encountered a vehicular collision where he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City two offenses – 1. Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to property; and 2. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries which was scheduled for arraignment on different dates, the latter earlier than the former. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence which quashal was refused by the Honorable trial court.

Issue: Whether the conviction on the first offense of a lesser penalty constitutes double jeopardy on the other.

Held: Yes. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Wright vs CA G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

Paul Joseph Wright vs The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

J. Kapunan

Facts: On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for several crimes.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense — in relation to the extradition — was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.

Issue: Whether an extradition treaty can be given retroactive application.

Held: Yes.

Does the Treaty’s retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. “Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.” This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. “It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.”

The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. In conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were signed by “an officer in or of the Requesting State”
“sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting State,” and “certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting State accredited to the Requested State.” 19 The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

Sanchez vs Darroca (G.R. No. 242257 October 15, 2019)

In The Matter of Petition For Writ of Amparo of Vivian A. Sanchez
Vivian Sanchez vs PSupt. Marc Anthony Darroca
G.R. No. 242257 October 15, 2019

J. Leonen

Facts: On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was among the seven (7) alleged members of the New People’s Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique. Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St. Peter’s Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news of her husband’s death. At the funeral home, however, the police officers stationed there took photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she left without being able to see or identify her husband’s body.

A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the funeral home, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her photo was being circulated at the police station. The officer urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband’s name, otherwise, they would go after her. PO2 De la Cruz also warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating officers, or they might suspect her and put her under surveillance.

The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her safety, Sanchez hurried home without confirming the identity of her husband’s body. Later that day, two (2) police officers went to Sanchez’s house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa.

In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband’s wake. She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children’s safety.

With this, Sanchez was forced to file for a petition for a Writ of Amparo. In an August 28, 2018 Order, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of amparo and a temporary protection order. It also directed members of the Philippine National Police to file a verified written return.

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to the privilege of a writ of amparo.

Held: Yes. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this Court as an exercise of its power to “promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights[.]” Section 1 defines a petition for a writ of amparo as “a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty[,] and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.” The writ of amparo is, thus, an equitable and extraordinary remedy primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies substantial evidence as the degree of proof required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further reinforces the requirement of substantial evidence for the petitioner to establish his or her allegations to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo.

Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the privileges they enjoy against State incursion into their relationships. Hence, respondents’ surveillance of petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or his activities is correctible by a writ of amparo.

The Philippine National Police’s Ethical Doctrine Manual enjoins its police officers to respect human dignity and human rights, and to judiciously use their authority in the performance of duty.

RCBC VS ORACION JR. (G.R. No. 223274 June 19, 2019)

RCBC Bankard Services Corporation vs Moises Oracion Jr and Emily L. Oracion
G.R. No. 223274 June 19, 2019

J. Caguioa

Facts:

Respondents Moises Oracion, Jr. (Moises) and Emily L. Oracion (Emily) (collectively, respondents) applied for and was issued a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum (credit card) on December 2, 2010 which was used on various dates but they failed to pay petitioner the total amount of ₱117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the minimum amount due under the credit card despite the receipt of the SOAs and a written demand letter dated January 26, 2012. Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money dated February 7, 2012 before the MeTC attaching therewith as annexes the statement of account as well as the demand letter.

The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner, as the plaintiff, failed to discharge the required burden of proof in a civil case, which is to establish its case by preponderance of evidence justifying that the signature in the attachments in support of the complaint are mere photocopies, stamp mark and that the Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as stamp mark, as long as the original evidence can be had. Absent a clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court; the photocopies must be disregarded being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence (PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO MARCOS, respondents, G.R. No 127469 2004 Jan 15, 1st Division).

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated December 17, 2012 on the ground that the MeTC Decision was contrary to the facts and law. In its Memorandum for Appellant, dated February 19, 2012, petitioner argued that what it attached to the complaint were the “duplicate original copies” and not mere photocopies. Petitioner also argued that: x x x [if for] unknown reasons or events the said Duplicate Original Copies were no longer found in the record of the court or that the copy of the Complaint intended for the court, where these Originals were attached, was not forwarded to the x x x MTC, [petitioner] respectfully submits that justice and equity dictates that the x x x MTC should have required [petitioner] to produce or reproduce the same instead of immediately dismissing the case on that ground alone. In which case, a clarificatory hearing for that purpose is proper. This is especially true in the present case considering that there were allegations in the complaint that the Duplicate Original Copies were attached as annexes therein; and that the x x x MTC motu proprio submitted the case for decision. Not to mention the fact that these documents are computer generated reports, in which case, [petitioner] could simply present another set of printed Duplicate Original Copies for the x x x MTC[‘s] perusal. The RTC found petitioner’s appeal to be without merit.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in affirming the MeTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint in that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC), an electronic document is to be regarded as an original thereof under the Best Evidence Rule and thus, with the presented evidence in “original duplicate copies,” petitioner has preponderantly proven respondents’ unpaid obligation.

Held: No. In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did not raise the Rules on Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called “duplicate original copies” of the SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic documents. Rather, it insisted that they were duplicate original copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere photocopies or substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC. As observed by the RTC, petitioner even tried to rectify the attachments (annexes) to its complaint, by filing a Manifestation dated August 9, 2012 wherein it attached copies of the said annexes. Unfortunately, as observed by the RTC, the attachments to the said Manifestation “are merely photocopies of the annexes attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp marks bearing the same inscription as the first stamp marks” that were placed in the annexes to the complaint. Because petitioner has not raised the electronic document argument before the RTC, it may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.

Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the proceedings before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal. Clearly, petitioner, by its acts and representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its complaint are not duplicate original copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the day for petitioner to switch theories.

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “[a]n electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.”

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.

With respect to paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original writing, instrument, deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of which are the subject of the inquiry. Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is regarded as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. As defined, “electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically; and it includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The term “electronic document” may be used interchangeably with “electronic data message” and the latter refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:

[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.49

[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.

Apparently, “duplicate original copies” or “multiple original copies” wherein two or more copies are executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3 above. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a “print-out or output” based on the definition of an electronic document, or a “counterpart” based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be allowed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules.

Vivares vs STC (G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014)

Rhonda Ave S. Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

J. Velasco Jr.

Facts: Sometime in January 2012, Escudero, a High school teacher from respondent, St. Theresa’s College found out that a number of students from the graduating class posted photos of them in their social media account in their undergarments. Using the school’s computer, the students were asked to log in their Facebook accounts and more photos were found wherein they are seen holding and drinking alcoholic beverages, with this, it was reported to discipline-in-charge resulting for the said students not allowed to attend the graduation. A petition for a writ of Habeas Data was filed before the Regional Trial Court by the student’s parents alleging that the act of the School of going into their children’s social media accounts is a violation of their right to privacy.

Issue: Whether the writ of Habeas Data shall issue against Saint Theresa’s College even if they are an entity not engage in data collecting and storing.

Held: Yes.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Meralco vs Lim (G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010)

Manila Electric Company vs Rosario Gopez Lim
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010

J. Carpio Morales

Facts: Respondent Lim is an administrative clerk at petitioner, Meralco wherein the respondent received a transfer order from his current post at Bulacan to the Alabang office after receiving an anonymous letter posted at the door of the metering office stating that he should leave the place. Lim requested for a deferment in the transfer but to no response, prompting her to file for a writ of Habeas Data before the Regional Trial Court in Bulacan alleging that petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.

Issue: Whether the respondent’s petition has merit.

Held: No.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.

Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.