People vs Bartolome (GR No 191726 February 06, 2013)

People of the Philippines vs Bartolome
GR No 191726 February 06, 2013

Facts:  On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit (ADSOU) in Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of ADSOU immediately instructed some of his men to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the pre-operation briefing, the buy-bust team designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his initials BP. It was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with the suspect had been consummated. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Upon arriving at the target area at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 2003, the team members positioned themselves in the vicinity of a store. The informant then approached a person who was standing in front of the store and dropped a cigarette butt in front of the person. Paras, then only two meters away from the informant, saw the dropping of the cigarette butt. Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong hawak magkano ba kukunin mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after which he handed the marked P100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew out a plastic sachet containing white substances from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras. With that, Paras scratched his head to signal the consummation of the sale. As the other members of the team were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, another member of the team, confiscated the marked P100.00 bill from the suspect, who was identified as Noel Bartolome y Bajo. Paras immediately marked the sachet at the crime scene with Bartolomes initials NBB. Insp. Cruz later requested in writing the PNP Crime Laboratory in Caloocan City to conduct a laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachet seized from Bartolome. PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another member of the buy-bust team, brought the request and the sachet and its contents to the laboratory. In due course, Forensic Chemical Officer Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed in Physical Science Report No. D-1038-03 that the plastic sachet contained 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

Issue: Whether the transaction resulting to the arrest of Bartolome is an instigation.

Held: No. Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as coprincipals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a “trap for the unwary innocent,” while entrapment is a “trap for the unwary criminal.

As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.

A police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a “decoy solicitation,” is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminals course of conduct. In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a “decoy solicitation” is not tantamount to inducement or instigation.

In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders, which is made difficult by the secrecy with which drug-related offenses are conducted and the many devices and subterfuges employed by offenders to avoid detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken judicial notice of the ugly reality that in cases involving illegal drugs, corrupt law enforcers have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and innocent persons. The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial. The balance needs to be struck between the individual rights and the presumption of innocence on one hand, and ensuring the arrest of those engaged in the illegal traffic of narcotics on the other.

Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested following an instigation for him to commit the crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. In a buy-bust operation, the pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction is consummated, the pusher is validly arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in the presence of the buyer. Here, Paras asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the marked bill from Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was shown to have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from Paras. There is no question that the idea to commit the crime originated from the mind of the accused.

Prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by the informant.

People vs Belocura (G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012)

People of the Philippines vs Belocura
G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012

Facts: Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila RTC through the information: That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) plastic bag colored red and white, with label “SHIN TON YON”, containing the following: One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams; One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams. With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution established the guilt of the accused using the evidence obtained.

Held: No. The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome.

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.

The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocura’s jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.

That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other. The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.

Resterio vs People (G.R. No. 177438 September 24, 2012)

Resterio vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 177438 September 24, 2012

Facts: That on May, 2002, or thereabouts, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent of gain, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue China Bank Check bearing No. AO141332, dated June 3, 2002, in the amount of P 50,000.00 payable to the order of Bernardo T. Villadolid to apply on account or for value, the accused fully knowing well that at the time of the issuance of said check that she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; or the accused having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when she make/s or draw/s and issue/s a check but she failed to keep sufficient funds or maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check, which check when presented for encashment was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “ACCT. CLOSED” or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, and despite notice of dishonor and demands for payment, said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem the check or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving the notice of dishonor, to the damage and prejudice of the aforenamed private complainant, in the aforestated amount and other claims and charges allowed by civil law.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be held liable criminally for violation of BP 22.

Held: No. For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Prosecution must prove the following essential elements, namely: (1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes all checks drawn against banks. The law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, either as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. 22. It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented for payment.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish that a check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it must further be shown that accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check that he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.

This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check is the second element of the offense. Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., “that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,” a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

People vs Arcillas (G.R. No. 181491 July 30, 2012)

People of the Philippines vs Arcillas
G.R. No. 181491 July 30, 2012

Facts: In the evening of May 12, 2000, AAA, then barely thirteen (13) years old, as evidenced by her certificate of live birth, went to sleep in a room shanty located in Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate, together with her two sisters, CCC and EEE, her mother and the latter’s live-in partner, accused Henry Arcillas. The shanty consisted of a single room measuring more or less four (4) square meters. At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was lying on top of her. She found out that accused Henry Arcillas was on top of her. She noticed that she had no more short pants and panties and that she felt pain in her vagina. She also noticed that something had been inserted into her vagina and that the accused was making a push and pull movement on top of her. She then pushed away the accused and awakened her mother Josie, who was just asleep near her. BBB then stood up and immediately lighted the gas lamp. She saw the accused beside AAA still naked. AAA told her mother that she was sexually abused by Henry Arcillas. BBB then grabbed an ax and struck the accused with it but the latter was not hit. Before BBB was awakened, CCC, who was at the right side of AAA, was awakened first because she heard the latter crying. She then saw Henry Arcillas already at the post of their hut.

Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for qualified rape.

Held: NO. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed – 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The elements of the offense charged are that: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.

Rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the victim’s parent. However, an accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information alleges the circumstances of the victim’s over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her relationship with him. The reason is that such circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are special qualifying circumstances. As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape, while moral damages are proper without need of proof other than the fact of rape by virtue of the undeniable moral suffering of AAA due to the rapes.

In addition, Arcillas was liable for exemplary damages. According to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability “when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.” The law permits such damages to be awarded “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.” Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of AAA to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of her minority and the common-law relationship between him and her mother. It did not matter that such qualifying circumstances were not taken into consideration in fixing his criminal liability, because the term aggravating circumstances as basis for awarding exemplary damages under the Civil Code was understood in its generic sense.

Valenzuela vs People (GR No. 160188 June 21, 2007)

Valenzuela vs People
GR No. 160188 June 21, 2007

Facts: On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00. Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of frustrated theft.

Held: No. under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Dio and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

The statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.

It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of taking itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the taking not having been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.