criminal law

People vs Eyam (GR No. 184056 November 26, 2012)

People of the Philippines vs Eyam
GR No. 184056 November 26, 2012

Facts: An information for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was filed on July 17, 2003 against accused-appellant George Eyam Y Watang to which upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty. After evaluating the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, the trial court, in its Decision dated March 8, 2006, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400,000.00. The honorable court of appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not the the identity of the illegal drug was properly identified despite the failure to present the forensic chemist. 

Held: Yes. Appellant wittingly overlooked the fact that during the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated that the specimen submitted for examination was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, per Physical Science Report No. D-925-03S.  This was the very reason why the testimony of the forensic chemist was dispensed with during the trial.  Stipulation of facts at the pre-trial constitutes judicial admissions which are binding and conclusive upon the parties.

Regarding the chain of custody rule, records reveal that after S/G Sahid confiscated and marked with GEW the plastic sachet containing the substance seized from appellant, S/G Sahid, together with his OIC Ruben Geronimo, then immediately brought the appellant and the plastic sachet to Police Community Precinct 2 from whence the incident was referred to the DEU for investigation.  PO3 Mapili thereafter received the plastic sachet and made a request for laboratory examination of its contents.  When the prosecution presented the marked specimen in court, these witnesses positively identified it to be the same plastic sachet seized from the appellant.  Thus, the prosecution had indubitably established the crucial links in the chain of custody as the evidence clearly show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated substance have been preserved.  This is the clear import of the chain of custody rule to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized item as it would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Significantly, in no instance did appellant manifest or at least intimate before the trial court that there were lapses in the handling and safekeeping of the seized item that might affect its admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value.  When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.  Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal as we ruled in People v. Sta. Maria and reiterated in People v. Hernandez.

In People v. Sembrano, we ruled that “for illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.”  All the foregoing elements were duly established by the prosecution in this case.  Appellant was caught in possession of shabu, a dangerous drug.  He failed to show that he was authorized to possess the same.  Lastly, by his mere possession of the drug, there is already a prima facie evidence of knowledge, which he failed to rebut.  All told, we sustain the conviction of appellant.

In the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.  And “in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner unless there is evidence to the contrary.” We cannot find anything to justify a deviation from the said rules.


People vs Soria (GR No. 179031 November 14, 2012)

People of the Philippines vs Soria
GR No. 179031 November 14, 2012

Facts: A complaint for rape was filed against the respondent for allegedly raping her minor daughter, AAA. The information indicated the offense as rape by sexual intercourse as defined by the Revised Penal Code. However, respondent as his defense invoked that as the father of the child he will not be able to do the imputed act and the case was tainted with bad faith on the part of the victim’s mother not having a good relationship with the respondent. During the course of the proceedings and examination of the witness, it was found out that the identification of the victim by the respondent was in reliance to her brother’s statement that he saw that it was their father who committed the act. The medico legal was also presented with the findings that the hymen of the victim is intact. These statements were invoked by the defense to question the findings of the trial court of the offense charged which was later affirmed by the appellate court, hence, this appeal. 

Issue: Whether or not the offense was properly charged.

Held: No. The  following  are the  elements  of  rape  by  sexual  assault: 

(1)  That  the  offender  commits  an  act  of  sexual  assault;   
(2)  That  the  act  of  sexual  assault  is  committed  by  any  of  the following  means: 

(a)  By inserting  his  penis  into  another  person’s  mouth  or  anal  orifice;  or 
(b)  By  inserting  any  instrument or  object  into  the  genital or anal orifice  of another  person; 

(3)  That  the act  of  sexual  assault  is accomplished  under  any  of  the following circumstances: 

(a)  By using  force  and  intimidation; 
(b)  When the  woman  is  deprived of  reason  or  otherwise  unconscious;  or 
(c)  By means  of  fraudulent  machination  or  grave  abuse  of  authority;  or 
(d)  When the  woman  is  under  12 years  of  age  or  demented.

In  the  instant case,  it  was  clearly  established  that  appellant  committed  an  act of sexual  assault  on “AAA”  by inserting  an  instrument  or object  into her genital.   We find it  inconsequential  that  “AAA”  could not  specifically identify  the particular  instrument  or  object  that  was  inserted  into  her  genital.    What  is important  and relevant  is  that  indeed something was  inserted into her vagina.   To require  “AAA”  to  identify  the  instrument  or object  that  was  inserted  into her vagina  would be  contrary to the  fundamental  tenets of  due  process.   It  would be akin  to requiring “AAA”  to  establish  something that  is  not  even  required  by  law.   [Moreover,  it  might  create  problems later  on  in  the  application  of  the  law  if  the victim  is  blind or otherwise  unconscious.]   Moreover,  the  prosecution satisfactorily  established  that  appellant  accomplished  the  act  of  sexual  assault through  his  moral  ascendancy  and  influence  over  “AAA”  which  substituted  for violence  and intimidation.   Thus,  there  is  no doubt  that  appellant  raped  “AAA”  by sexual  assault.

The  failure of “AAA” to  mention that  her  panty  was  removed prior to the rape  does  not  preclude  sexual  assault.    We  cannot  likewise  give  credence  to  the assertion  of  appellant  that  the  crime  of  rape  was  negated by  the  medical  findings of an intact  hymen or absence  of lacerations  in the  vagina  of “AAA”.   Hymenal rupture,  vaginal  laceration or genital  injury is  not  indispensable  because  the  same is not an  element  of the  crime of rape.   “An  intact  hymen  does  not  negate a finding that  the victim  was  raped.”    Here,  the  finding of reddish discoloration  of the  hymen  of  “AAA”  during  her medical  examination  and the intense pain  she felt in  her  vagina  during  and  after  the  sexual  assault  sufficiently  corroborated  her testimony  that  she was  raped.    

Likewise  undeserving  of credence  is  appellant’s  contention that  his  wife merely  instigated “AAA”  to  file the  charge of rape  against  him  in  retaliation  for his  having  confronted her about  her  illicit affair  with  another  man.    This imputation  of  ill  motive  is  flimsy considering that  it  is  unnatural  for appellant’s wife  to  stoop so low  as  to  subject  her own  daughter  to the hardships and  shame concomitant  with  a  prosecution for rape,  just  to assuage  her hurt  feelings.   It is also  improbable  for appellant’s  wife to  have  dared  encourage their  daughter “AAA”  to  publicly  expose  the  dishonor of the  family unless  the  rape  was  indeed committed.

People vs Ending (GR No. 183827 November 12, 2012)

People of the Philippines vs Ending
GR No. 183827 November 12, 2012

Facts: In three  separate  Information,  appellant  was  indicted  for raping his  own daughter,  “AAA.” In several occasions, respondent allegedly raped her minor daughter which was duly supported by a medico legal report showing that the victim have old lacerations. On the other hand, respondent denied said allegation and countered the same with an alibi saying that the victim does not live with him but with her grandparents and that the laceration was due to an incident where another person, GGG raped her.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes. The  defense  of  appellant  is  anchored on denial  and  alibi  which  do not impress  belief.   As often  stressed,  “[m]ere denial,  if unsubstantiated by clear  and convincing  evidence,  has  no weight  in law  and cannot  be  given greater evidentiary value than  the positive  testimony  of a  rape  victim.” In  this  case,  appellant’s testimony,  particularly  his  denial,  was  not substantiated  by  clear and convincing evidence.   Also,  for  his  alibi  to prosper,  appellant  must establish  that he  was  not  at the  locus delicti  at  the  time the offense  was  committed  and  that  it  was physically impossible  for him  to  be  at  the  scene  of the  crime  at the  time  of  its commission.  Appellant  failed  to  establish  these  elements.    The  fact  that “AAA”  was living  with her grandparents  did  not preclude  the  possibility  that  appellant  was present  at the crime  scenes  during  their  commission.   Appellant himself  admitted  that  the distance between his  residence and  that  of “AAA’s”  grandparents  is  only approximately 7½  kilometers  and  which  can be  traversed  by riding a  pedicab  in less than  30  minutes.   In other  words,  it  was  not  physically impossible  for appellant  to  have  been  at  the  situs  of the  crimes  during the  dates  when the separate acts  of  rape  were  committed.   Moreover,  it has been  invariably  ruled  that  alibi cannot  prevail  over  the  positive  identification  of the  accused.    Here,  appellant  was positively identified  by “AAA”  as  the perpetrator  of the  crimes  without  showing any dubious reason  or  fiendish  motive  on  her part  to  falsely  charge him.   The contention  of appellant  that  “AAA”  was  motivated by hatred  because  he prevented  her from  having  a  boyfriend  is  unconvincing.   There  is  nothing novel  in such  a  contrived  defense.    “Motives  such  as  resentment,  hatred  or  revenge  have never  swayed this  Court  from  giving full  credence  to the  testimony of a rape victim.”  It  is  a  jurisprudentially  conceded  rule  that  “it is  against  human  nature for a  young  girl  to fabricate  a  story that  would expose  herself  as  well  as  her family to  a  lifetime  of shame,  especially  when  her  charge could  mean the  death or lifetime imprisonment  of her  own  father.”

The  Court,  like  the courts  below,  finds  that  “AAA”  was  without  doubt telling  the  truth  when  she  declared  that  her  father  raped  her  on  three separate occasions.   She  was  consistent  in her narration on how  she  was  abused  by  her father in their own house,  in the  copra  drier,  and even in a  nearby  pasture  land.  After she  was  forced  to  lie  down,  appellant  removed her clothes,  went  on  top of her,  inserted his  penis  into her vagina  and threatened her with death if she  would report  the  incidents.   Hence,  appellant’s  attempt  to  discredit  the  testimony of “AAA”  deserves  no  merit.   “When  credibility  is in  issue,  the court generally defers  to the  findings  of the  trial  court  considering that  it  was  in a better  position  to decide  the  question,  having  heard  the  witnesses themselves  and  observed  their deportment  during trial.”  Here,  there is  nothing from  the records  that  would impel  this  Court  to  deviate  from  the  findings  and conclusions  of the  trial  court  as affirmed by the  CA.

Morillo vs People (G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015)

Morillo vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015
Facts: Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks. Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.
Issue: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. 
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. 
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal. In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court explained: This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court’s jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.

Bongalon vs People (G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013)

Bongalon vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

Facts: The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him “sissy”; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like “strangers” and “animals”; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1×1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left. On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters “Kimi” and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a “sissy.” She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.

Issues: Whether or not the proper remedy of the petitioner is via a petition for certiorari.

Whether or not petitioner is liable for child abuse.

Held: No. The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. “the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. – (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.  x x x x

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. – x x x x (b) “Child Abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

People vs PO2 Valdez (G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013)

People of the Philippines vs PO2 Valdez
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013

Facts: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit. The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self- explanatory letter dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.

Issue: Whether or not the judgement by the appellate court downgrading the penalty of Edwin’s co-accused is applicable to him.

Held: Yes. On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

A literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal,” as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co- accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.

People vs Teodoro (G.R. No. 175876 February 20, 2013)

People of the Philippines vs Teodoro
G.R. No. 175876 February 20, 2013

Facts: Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with statutory rape. Based on the medical certificate, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte charged Teodoro with two counts of statutory rape through the informations. At his arraignment on August 17, 1998, Teodoro pleaded not guilty to the informations. Although he subsequently manifested a willingness to change the pleas to guilty, he balked when he was re-arraigned on December 23, 1998 by qualifying that he had only “fingered” AAA. Accordingly, the RTC reinstated his pleas of not guilty. During the trial, AAA and BBB testified for the Prosecution, but two years later recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAA’s vagina on the nights of December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998.

Issue: Whether or not the recantation of the victim be considered in determining the penalty of the accused.

Held: No. The crimes charged were two counts of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the female’s deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. Full penile penetration of the female’s genitalia is not likewise required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female.  The Court has clarified in People v. Campuhan that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim.  This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v. Bali-Balita, the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established.

As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses.